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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATES
EXTENDING PERSONHOOD TO THE
UNBORN
Alec Walen*
In 1992, Ronald Dworkin made a provocative argument
that states cannot be given the liberty to declare fetuses to be
persons. 1 The argument can be represented as follows: Federal
constitutional law recognizes a fundamental liberty interest in
controlling "whether to bear or beget a child. "2 This liberty interest in choosing whether to bear a child implies that women
have a legal right to choose whether to have an abortion unless
the state has a compelling interest to the contrary. States have a
compelling interest to the contrary if and only if either unborn
humans are persons under the federal Constitution, or states can
declare them to be, in effect, persons with rights under state law.
Unborn humans are not persons under the federal Constitution.
Moreover, if states had the power to declare unborn humans to
be, in effect, persons in whose welfare they could take a compelling interest, they would thereby have the power to undermine
federally protected constitutional rights. Such a power would be
inconsistent with the supremacy of federal law. As Dworkin put
it: "If a fetus is not part of the constitutional population, under
the national constitutional arrangement, then states have no
power to overrule that national arrangement by themselves declaring that fetuses have rights competitive with the constitutional rights of pregnant women. "3

• Alec Walen is an associate professor of Philosophy at the University of Baltimore. I would like to thank Fred Schauer, Lawrence Solum, Jacqueline Ross, Thomas
Ulen, Dennis McGrath, Tom Curley, Eric Compton and Jim Chen, my editor at Constitutional Commentary, for their comments on earlier drafts.
!. Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be
Overruled, 59 U. On. L. REv. 381,400-01 (1992). The argument is repeated in RONALD
DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 113-14 (1993).
2. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
3. Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights, supra note 1, at 401.
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This argument is no mere academic exercise. It was quoted
at some length, that same year, by Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 4 Justice Stevens
quoted the argument in a note following his assertion that "as a
matter of federal constitutional law, a developing organism that
is not yet a 'person' does not have what is sometimes described
as a 'right to life. "' 5 Given that Dworkin's argument does not
support, but rather rests on, Justice Stevens's claim about federal
constitutional law, Justice Stevens presumably offered it not as
support for his claim about federal law, but as a warning to those
who would suggest that states could unilaterally choose to declare unborn humans to be persons. Justice Stevens presumably
meant to endorse the thought that states cannot "increase the
constitutional population by unilateral decision [and thereby]
decrease rights the national Constitution grants to others. " 6
Although it has been fourteen years since Dworkin published this argument and Justice Stevens cited it, no one has yet
subjected the argument to detailed critical analysis. 7 The argument, however, should not be ignored. It may well come back
into play as states, as well as the federal government, are passing
laws that recognize unborn humans as persons for purposes
other than restricting abortions. On April 1, 2004, President
Bush signed into federal law the "Unborn Victims of Violence
Act of 2004," making the killing of an unborn person (other than
as part of an abortion sought by a woman) a crime punishable as
if a born person had been killed (with the exception that the
death penalty is not available). 8 A number of states have recently pursued basically the same legal strategy. For example,
Texas's "Prenatal Protection Act," extends the protections of
the entire criminal code to "an unborn child at every stage of
gestation from fertilization until birth." 9 Utah's criminal law,
4. 505 U.S. 833,913 n.2 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring).
5. /d. at 913.
6. I d. at 913 n.2 (quoting Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights, supra note 1, at 400).
7. The most extensive analysis I have seen was provided by Richard Posner, Legal
Reasoning from the Top Down and from the Bottom Up: The Question of Unenumerated
Constitutional Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 433,444 (1992). But this analysis was given in a
symposium put on by the University of Chicago, in which both Dworkin and Posner participated, and Dworkin has already taken it into account in his original piece.
8. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841 (West 2006).
9. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.07 (a)(26), 19.06 (1) and 19.06 (2) (2003). This
law does not, however, apply to "conduct committed by the mother of the unborn child,"
to "a lawful medical procedure performed by a physician or other licensed health care
provider with the requisite consent," or to "a lawful medical procedure performed by a
physician or other licensed health care provider with the requisite consent as part of assisted reproduction." /d.§§ 19.06 (1)-(3).
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with an exception carved out for abortion, treats the killing of an
"unborn child" at any stage of pre-natal development like any
other homicide. 10 In addition, with exceptions carved out for
abortions, 18 other states have laws that criminalize killing unborn humans from conception onwards, and seven other states
have laws that criminalize killing unborn humans starting some
time after conception but before viability. 11 Some states are even
contemplating laws that directly challenge, for all purposes, the
claim in Roe that unborn humans deserve fewer basic protections than born humans. For example, South Carolina's legislature is considering, at the time of this writing, a bill entitled the
"Right to Life Act of South Carolina." According to this bill,
"The right to due process, whereby no person may be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and the
right to equal protection of the laws, both of which rights are
guaranteed by ... the Constitution of this State, vest at fertilization."12
Laws of this sort could become the predicate for states and
the federal government to challenge the claim in Roe v. Wade
that "the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense." 13 Dworkin's argument, if sound, would
deny states, as well as the federal government, the power to pursue this avenue for challenging Roe. My claim here is that
Dworkin's argument does not actually help defend Roe. Rather,
it presupposes what it purports to support-namely, that states,
and the federal government, are constitutionally barred from
recognizing unborn humans as persons with rights. As a result, it
begs the question. As a further result, the substantive holding of
Roe- that women have a fundamental right to choose an abortion- is in greater jeopardy than is generally acknowledged.

10.
II.

UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-5-201 (1)(a)-(b) (West 2005).
S~e _National Right to Life Committee, State Homicide Laws That Recognize

l!~bom VIctims, http://www.nrlc.org/Unbom_Victims/Statehomicidelaws092302.html (last
VISited Mar. 9, 2006). For a general discussion of the possibility of using legal protection of
the fetus to undermine Roe, see Aaron Wagner, Texas Two-Step: Serving up Fetal Rights
by Side-Stepping Roe v. Wade Has Set the Table for Another Showdown on Fetal Personhood in Texas and Beyond, 32 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1085 (2001).
12. South Carolina General Assembly, 115th Session, 2005-2006, available at
http://www.scstatehouse.net/sessl16_2005-2006/bills/3213.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
13. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
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I. ROE AND THE STATUS OF

UNBORN HUMAN LIFE
To appreciate how changes in state and federal law, providing greater protection to the unborn, could undermine the substantive holding of Roe, it is necessary to revisit the argument in
Roe. Roe, at its core, is based on two premises. The first is that
women have a fundamental liberty interest in controlling
whether to beget and bear children; the second is that states do
not have a compelling interest sufficient to override the woman's
liberty interest. Many critics, including the two original dissenters in Roe, Justices Rehnquist and White, have assailed Roe's
first premise. But I believe Dworkin is right. Roe's first premise
is solidly grounded in a wide range of uncontroversial Supreme
Court opinions. 14 As a matter of constitutional law, Roe's second
premise is more controversial.
The second premise, that states do not have a compelling interest sufficient to override a woman's liberty interest, turns on
two further claims: first, that unborn humans are not persons
under constitutional law, and second, that states do not have a
compelling interest in protecting unborn human life, at least not
until it reaches the stage of viability. The first claim seems sufficiently well supported by three kinds of reasons relied on in Roe
itself. First, insofar as the text of the Constitution offers any evidence of what counts as a person, it treats them as "born" persons, and no case has ever treated an unborn human as a person
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 15 The Fourteenth Amendment starts: "All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside." 16 The impli14. Roe itself starts by grounding the right to privacy, citing Union Pacific R. Co. v.
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (First
Amendment); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (Fourth and Fifth Amendments);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,350 (1967) (same); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886) (same); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (same); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484-85 (1965) (penumbras of the
Bill of Rights or the Ninth Amendment); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923) (the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment). 410 U.S. at 152. Roe then cites a number of cases to demonstrate the range of activities for which the privacy right had been deemed fundamental: Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,541-42 (1942) (procreation); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453--54, 460, 463--65 (1972) (contraception);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (family relationships); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (child rearing and education); and Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. at 399 (same). 410 U.S. at 152-53.
15. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1, cited in Roe, 410 U.S. at 157 (emphasis added).
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cation is that there are two routes to citizenship: birth and naturalization. It might be suggested that citizenship depends on
birth, but that personhood status does not. Were that true, the
Privileges and Immunities clause, which protects citizens of the
United states, would protect only those who are born, while the
Due Process and Equal Protection clauses, which protect persons generally, would apply even to the unborn. 17 This, however,
is clearly an implausible reading. There is no reason to distinguish these clauses in terms of the born and the unborn. The difference between these clauses is much more plausibly interpreted by reading the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses
as providing an extra level of protection to citizens, who form a
subset of persons, that is, born humans.
A second reason to think the unborn are not persons under
the Constitution is that, from the drafting of the Constitution to
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, abortion was tolerated to a degree inconsistent with the belief that constitutional
protections were afforded to the unborn. 18 Arguably, under a
framework different from that articulated in Roe, abortion can
be justified in a fairly wide range of cases, even if the unborn
humans who are killed have the legal status of born persons. 19 If
that is correct, then it cannot be argued that abortion was tolerated to a degree actually inconsistent with the unborn having the
status of persons. But it would still make sense to say that, since
most people would have (wrongly) thought abortion should be
unavailable if the unborn were persons, the fact that abortion
was generally available indicates the people did not conceive of
the unborn as persons.
A third reason to think the unborn are not persons under
the Constitution is that the rights of unborn humans under the
law in general at the time of Roe was inconsistent with their having the status of persons under the Constitution. Even Texas, the
state whose law was directly challenged in Roe, did not treat the
killing of unborn humans as on a par with the killing of born persons. As the Roe Court noted, it is difficult to reconcile the claim
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any Jaw which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." (emphases added)).
18. I believe it was largely to make this point that Justice Blackmun engaged in his
long, historical exploration of abortion. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 129--39.
19. See, e.g., Alec Walen, ConsensUJJ/ Sex Without Assuming the Risk of Carrying an
Unwanted Fetus; Another Foundation for the Right to an Abonion, 63 BROOK. L. REV.
1051 (1997).
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that unborn humans are persons under the Fourteenth Amendment with the fact that Texas, along with most other states, allowed abortions to save the life of the mother. "[I]f the fetus is a
person who is not to be deprived of life without due process of
law, and if the mother's condition is the sole determinant, does
not the Texas exception appear to be out of line with the
Amendment's command?" 20 This point may be less telling than
the Court thought. Arguably, in the battle between two innocents, only one of whom can survive, the state could choose to
side with the mother. But the Court followed up with a more
persuasive point. It noted that "in Texas the woman is not a
principal or an accomplice with respect to an abortion upon
her." 2 In cases where her life is not at risk, if she is not thought
to have a right to an abortion, and if the fetus is a person, then
"why is the woman not a principal or an accomplice [in its murder]?"22
The second claim, that states do not have a compelling interest in protecting human life from conception onward, is more
problematic. To understand it correctly, we need to distinguish
the two ways the Court approached this issue. First, the Court
considered what was essentially a metaphysical claim, that human life from conception onward has a status such that states
have a compelling interest in protecting it. Second, the Court examined legal practice to see whether states consistently treat the
unborn as legal persons. 23
The Court refused to endorse the metaphysical claim, because there has long been and continues to be disagreement between "those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine,
philosophy, and theology" as to the question whether life, in the
relevant senses, "begins at conception." 24 Noting this disagreement, the Court concluded that it "is not in a position to speculate as to the answer." 25 The Court could have left Texas to
make its own metaphysical judgment. But there is some sense in
its refusal to do so. Given that a fundamental liberty interest
20.

410 U.S. at 157 n.54.

21.

/d.

22.

/d.
23. Logically a third option is available, namely that states could have a compelling
interest in fetal life or in preventing abortion that is not grounded in the legal status of
the fetus. For example, the state might claim a compelling interest in promoting respect
for human life in general. Such a move would presumably face the same challenges as the
move to treat fetuses as persons under the law, and I therefore leave it to the side.
24. 410 U.S. at 159.
25. ld.

2005]

PERSONHOOD FOR THE UNBORN

167

hangs in the balance, the Court could not simply accept a claim
about the status of human life without assessing it. If, however,
the Court were to accept that, in some metaphysically relevant
sense, "life begins at conception," then it would have to apply
that claim generally. A metaphysical claim cannot be true for
Texas but false for, say, New York. Texas can choose to take a
metaphysical stand in a way that New York would not? 6 But
again, a fundamental liberty interest hangs in the balance here.
The Court could credit Texas's position as giving it a compelling
reason to limit a woman's right to abortion only if it could credit
Texas's claim that life begins at conception as true. That, however, would be inconsistent with also allowing New York to deny
that life begins at conception. Thus, by arguing that life begins at
conception, Texas was taking a stand much like the stand it took
in arguing that fetuses are persons under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The implications of accepting Texas's argument
would be too strong, too limiting of the freedom of other states.
Declaring the metaphysical status of human life from conception onward legally out of bounds, the Court turned to legal
practice with regard to unborn human life. It looked to see
whether the law "endorse[ d] any theory that life, as we recognize
it, begins before life [sic] birth or ... accord[ed] legal rights to
the unborn except in narrowly defined situations and except
when the rights are contingent upon life [sic] birth. " 27 The Court
found that the answer was no. It then concluded that "the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the
whole sense. "28

26. It is an interesting question whether a state can take a controversial metaphysical position, and ground criminal laws on that basis, without violating the restrictions the
Court enunciated in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Reviewing a Texas law making same-sex sodomy a crime, the Court noted that condemnation of sodomy "has been
shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for
the traditional family." Id. at 571. The Court did not dismiss the relevance of these
sources of moral and ethical guidance for individuals. But it held that the issue for the
Constitution "is whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these
views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law." Id. It answered this
question in the negative. One could read this holding as implying that religious, and presumably metaphysical, beliefs cannot be the ground for criminal law. But, of course, the
state must appeal to some sort of political morality to ground its laws, and arguably political morality cannot remain neutral on questions such as "What is a person?" This issue
engages the debate concerning public reason and perfectionism, which is one of the central debates in contemporary political theory. It is therefore completely beyond the scope
of this paper. For an overview of the debate, see WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY
POLmCAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCilON (2001), especially chapter 6.
27. 410 U.S. at 161.
28. Id. at 162.
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Critically, the Court did not deny that Texas could have had
a set of laws by which it "endorsed" a theory that life, for legal
purposes, begins before birth. It did not deny that Texas could
"accord" legal rights to the unborn in a wide range of circumstances, not contingent upon live birth. In other words, it did not
deny that there are circumstances under which Texas could
choose to take a compelling interest in the life of unborn humans. What it said, in essence, is that Texas, like the rest of the
United States, does not, in fact, treat unborn humans as persons
with rights. Were Texas to reform the way it treats the unborn in
general, it could revisit the issue, and the Court would then have
no legal basis for denying that Texas has a compelling interest in
protecting the life of the unborn.
It could be objected that the Court in Roe did take a stand
on when states have a compelling interest in fetal life, namely
when fetuses become viable. The Court chose viability "because
the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life
outside the mother's womb. "29 The Court then claimed that it
followed that "[s ]tate regulation protective of fetal life after viability ... has both logical and biological justifications. " 30
The question is, are there really logical and biological justifications for saying that states have a compelling interest in fetal
life at viability, and not sooner or later? The Court offers nothing to back up that claim. But it might seem plausible enough
that viability is the important place to draw the line because it is
the point after which a woman's interest in terminating a pregnancy and a fetus's interest in life can, at least in theory, both be
accommodated. If a woman wants to terminate her pregnancy at
that point, she normally could do so without the fetus having to
die. But there are two reasons to doubt that viability really
marks a logical and biological turning point. One reason has to
do with the actual practical significance of viability for women
who might want an abortion. The other reason has to do with the
moral status of a fetus as it develops.
Turning first to the pragmatic issue, there is reason to doubt
that a woman could abort her pregnancy in such a way to keep a
viable fetus alive without extra costs to her. The obvious methods for ending a pregnancy early without killing the fetus all
have their risks. Chemical induction of premature labor requires

29.
30.

!d. at 163.
!d.
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constant monitoring, and only takes place in hospital settings. 31
Hysterotomies are considered major surgery and are very rarely
used. 32 And using the technique of dilation and extraction, without collapsing the fetus's head, would require more dilation of
the cervix than would typically be required for a dilation and extraction abortion in which the fetus's head is collapsed, with associated risks from extra artificial dilation. 33 This raises the question whether a woman who carries a potentially viable fetus and
who wants to end her pregnancy could be legally required to undergo one of these procedures to maximize the chance that a live
birth would result. The answer seems to be no. The case law
from Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologisti4 to Stenberg v. Carharf 5 makes it clear that abortion
procedures cannot be banned, nor others required, if the result
would be to endanger the health of women seeking an abortion,
even after fetal viability. The only question these cases leave
open is whether these holdings apply to cases in which a woman
seeks an abortion for reasons unrelated to her own health, such
as the discovery that the fetus has some sort of birth defect? 6 If
these holdings do not extend to such "elective" reasons for an
abortion, then arguably states have a freer hand. If a woman has
no health-based reasons to have an abortion, and she seeks an
abortion when her fetus is at least potentially viable, and the
state could require her either to carry the fetus to term or to end
her pregnancy only in a way that would protect the potential for
live birth, then viability would have some practical significance. 37
But it is unclear if the Court would read its prior cases that way,
and thus unclear if the Court really does appreciate the pragmatic "logic" of viability.
31. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 963
(N.D. Cal. 2004) (discussing various forms of mid to late term abortions and their health
risks, based on the testimony of numerous medical experts).
32. See id.
33. See id. at 989 (describing the risk of dilation). Note, however, that some medical
authorities claim that there is no reason that live births could not generally be provided
as easily as an abortion for viable fetuses. See excerpts of the Congressional Hearings on
the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, available at http://www.nrlc.org/abortion/pbal
pbafact13. html (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
34. 476 u.s. 747 (1986).
35. 530 u.s. 914 (2000).
36. Amniocentesis to determine whether a fetus has birth defects that could give
parents a reason to abort a pregnancy is usually done from 15 to 18 weeks of gestational
development. See, e.g., http://my.webmd.com/hw/being_pregnant/hw1810.asp (last visited
Mar. 9, 2006). But amniocentesis can be done later in term, and there is no reason to
think that some women will not discover a birth defect using that, or some other, test
only after the fetus is viable.
37. See Carhan, 530 U.S. at 1010 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
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Even if the pragmatic logic of viability would be respected
by the Court, it makes analytic sense to distinguish the question
of when a state has a compelling interest in fetal life, because of
its own moral status, from when the state can effectively do
something to protect both fetal life and a woman's right to decide whether to bear a child. Focusing on the fetus alone, it
would make as much if not more biological sense to draw the
line at when it becomes conscious (and can feel pain),38 or when
it becomes a single indivisible entity,39 or when it starts to develop as a life of its own (that is, from conception forward), than
to draw the line at when it can live outside the womb. I am not
suggesting that the Court should have relied on any of these
points in development in place of viability. The moral relevance
of all of these points can be debated, 40 and just as I think the
Court was right to refuse to take a stand on the metaphysics of
personhood, I think it should not have tried to settle this kind of
moral debate. But that does not mean that the Court can defend
using the viability line as grounded in "biological justifications"
either.
Given that viability has no real "biological" significance, it
seems that the most charitable way to read the Court's decision
to draw a line at viability is to read the Court as moved by the
38. The point at which fetuses become sentient is the point in development at which
Dworkin would consider fetuses to acquire rights. He argues that before that point, fetuses cannot have interests and therefore cannot have rights. See DWORKIN, LIFE'S
DOMINION, supra note 1,at 16-19. Some have theorized that fetuses can feel pain as early
as 13 weeks into gestation. See, e.g., Vivette Glover & Nicholas M. Fisk, Fetal Pain: Implications for Research and Practice, 106 BRIT. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 881, 882
(1999). But the consensus view is that the ability to feel pain arises later in development.
See National Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing expert testimony that the onset of fetal ability to feel pain is 20 weeks); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 997-99 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citing
expert testimony that the onset of fetal ability to feel pain is between 22 and 26 weeks).
This period from 20-26 weeks overlaps with the period at which fetuses are now considered viable. ("A fetus is generally viable between twenty-three and twenty-four weeks
from the first day of the woman's last menstrual period." Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 330 F.
Supp. 2d at 440 n.3.) Further research, however, may show that the onset of fetal ability
to feel pain is either a few weeks earlier or a few weeks later than when most fetuses are
viable. Moreover, the ability to support fetuses outside the womb may reach earlier into
pregnancy as technology develops; the time it take for a fetus to develop the ability to
feel pain is fixed as a matter of biology.
39. Embryos become single, indivisible entities when the possibility of "twinning"
ceases, at around 14 days into development. See THE PREsiDENT'S CoUNCIL ON
BIOETHICS, HUMAN O..ONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY: AN ETIIICAL INQUIRY 136 (2002),
available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreportlindex.htrnl (last visited April 3,

2006).
40. For a discussion of the problems inherent in appealing to the criterion Dworkin
invokes, the ability to have conscious experience, see DAVID BOONIN, A DEFENSE OF
ABORTION 116-22 (2003).
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pragmatic logic of viability. The Court presumably believed that
by drawing a line at viability it could give the states some room
to take a compelling interest in the life of unborn humans, and
yet it could protect women's fundamental liberty interest in controlling their reproduction. But the analytic framework for this
pragmatic logic is confused. It makes more analytic sense to distinguish when a state has a compelling interest in fetal life from
when it can do something about that interest without infringing
on a woman's liberty interests. Thus the pragmatic logic of viability in Roe does not provide a solid basis for resisting the
claim that states can take a compelling interest in the lives of the
unborn if they choose to treat the unborn as persons in the
whole sense.
II. IS ROE REALLY THREATENED?
Some may think that, in reality, there is no need to worry
about states undermining Roe. States, it may seem, are not about
to treat the unborn as persons "in the whole sense." Even the recent Unborn Victims of Violence Act, despite generally treating
the killing of a fetus as on a par with the killing of a born person,
makes some exceptions. For one thing, the death penalty is not
available for killing a fetus, 41 though it is sometimes available for
killing a born person. More significantly, it is clear that it would
be nearly politically impossible for even the most socially conservative states to enact laws declaring, should Roe be reversed,
that they will prosecute women who have abortions for murder.
At first blush, this seems to be an important limit on the antiabortion agenda. If some states want to argue that their practice is now inconsistent with the claim in Roe that "the unborn
have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole
sense," 42 then they must not give women who seek abortions a
free pass. They may be able to recognize certain circumstancessay those in which a woman's pregnancy threatens her life or
health43 -in which a woman is justified in having an abortion
even if the unborn human she carries has the legal status of a
41. See18 U.S.C.A. § 1841(a)(2)(D) (West 2004).
42. 410 u.s. 113, 162 (1973).
43. These are circumstances they may have to embrace if the argument is that they
have a compelling interest in protecting the life of the unborn, since Roe does not allow
states to prohibit abortions that are necessary for the life or health of a woman even if
her fetus is viable, that is, even if the state has a compelling interest in its health. See id.
at 163--64. If, however, Roe's substantive holding were reversed, there is little reason to
think that the health exception would be legally sacrosanct.
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person. But in general, to undermine Roe's finding that states
don't treat fetus as persons in the whole sense, states would have
to rebut the rhetorical question framed in Roe: "If the fetus is a
person, why is the woman [who seeks an abortion] not [criminally liable as] a principal or an accomplice (to a murder]?" 44
The fact that not even the most conservative state is likely
to be politically ready any time soon to prosecute women who
seek abortions as principals or accomplices to murder does not,
however, show that Roe is on firm ground. Socially conservative
states that want to claim that they are ready to treat unborn humans as persons in the whole sense can plausibly explain why
they would not prosecute women as harshly for seeking an abortion as they would prosecute a third party for performing one.45
They might start by marking an analogy between abortions and
suicides. No state currently prosecutes those who attempt suicide.46 But they all, with a narrowly drawn exception in Oregon,47 do prosecute those who assist suicide. Indeed, the Model
Penal Code suggests that assisting suicide should be a felony. 48
The analogy, of course, is not perfect. For one thing, presumably
someone willing to kill himself cannot be deterred with threats;
presumably, however, most women who consider abortions can
be deterred with threats. But at a more general level, the analogy is apt. A state might with reason choose to focus its prosecutorial resources on those who would be serially involved in abortions, namely the abortion providers, and leave individual
women who seek abortions subject to lesser charges. Moreover,
states could argue that women should be subject to lesser penalties because carrying an unwanted pregnancy may constitute
something like duress. 49
44. !d. at 157 n.54.
45. I am indebted to Dennis McGrath for pressing me on this point.
46. For rather obvious reasons, no state can prosecute someone for a successful suicide. Such prosecutions used to occur, but the punishment was meted out only to the "estate," i.e. the family of the suicide. All states eventually came to recognize that this was
unfair. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,713 (1997).
47. See Oregon's Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT.§ 127.800 (2003).
48. "A person who purposely aids or solicits another to commit suicide is guilty of a
felony of the second degree if his conduct causes such suicide or an attempted suicide,
and otherwise of a misdemeanor." Model Penal Code§ 210.5(2) (Official Draft andRevised Comments 1980).
49. But cf Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778 (S.C. 1997) (upholding a conviction
for criminal child neglect against a mother for taking cocaine during pregnancy); Nancy
K. Schiff, Legislation Punishing Drug Use During Pregnancy: Attack on Women'~ Rights
in the Name of Fetal Protection, 19 HAsTINGS CaNST. L.Q. 197 (1991) (reportmg that
mothers are being held criminally liable for harm they do to their babies in utero; focusing specifically on states such as Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana, and Ohio that have al-
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In addition, for some states, if they see criminalizing a
woman's choice to get an abortion as the key to escaping the
constraints of Roe, they may be willing to indicate a willingness
to do so as soon as the Supreme Court would allow them to do
so. It is also unclear exactly how far a state would have to go to
challenge the claim that it does not take a compelling interest in
the life of unborn humans. Does it really have to treat unborn
humans as persons "in the whole sense" in order to take a compelling interest in their lives? Perhaps it would be sufficient if it
treated them as persons in most regards. Perhaps Texas has not
yet gone far enough, but if pro-life forces continue to be dominant in the legislature, it may go that far in the next few years.
Thus Dworkin's argument that states cannot overrule a national
constitutional right is not merely an academic exercise.
III. DWORKIN'S ARGUMENT TO
FILL THE GAP IN ROE
Dworkin's argument is meant to shore up Roe at this point
where its rationale is most contingent. It is meant to show why
states cannot escape Roe's holding by taking a different attitude
towards fetuses in general and claiming on that basis a right to
impose new, perhaps strict, limits on abortions.
Recall that Dworkin's position is that if states could simply
declare that fetuses were persons with rights, they would thereby
"overrule" nationally guaranteed constitutional rights. Because
of the supremacy of federal law over state law, states lack this
power. Indeed, because of the supremacy of constitutional law
over statutory law, even Congress may lack this power, except
insofar as it plays its constitutional role, granted to it in Article
V, in amending the Constitution.
With regard to the power of Congress, the Court in Boerne
50
v. Flores ruled that Congress cannot interpret the Constitution
in a way that contradicts the Court's interpretation and use that
interpretation to undermine a Court ruling about how to balance
state power and individual rights. "[C]ongress does not enforce a
constitutional right by changing what the right is." 51 In the same
spirit, it is clear that Congress could not overrule the Court's
ready made it a felony to give birth to a drug·addicted child). See generally Dorothy E.
Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the
Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991).
50. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
51. /d. at 508.
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holding that unborn humans are not persons under the Fourteenth Amendment. At most, Congress could declare unborn
humans to be persons under federal statutory and regulatory
52
law. But again, if Dworkin's argument is correct, Congress can
no more declare unborn humans to be persons in a way that
would "overrule" nationally guaranteed constitutional rights
than states can.
Taking Dworkin's argument, then, to apply to both the
states and Congress, the question is whether it works. An obvious objection to Dworkin's argument is that it is inconsistent
with powers the states clearly do have. As Richard Posner put it:
[S]tates are allowed to decide what is property and (in the
case of prisoners for example) what is liberty, for purposes of
the Due Process Clause; why not what is a person? Can't a
state decide that death means brain death rather than a
stopped heart? And if it can decide when life ends why can't it
decide when life begins? 53

Dworkin has a fairly convincing reply to this objection.
States are not free to define such things at will. A state could
not, for example, "change constitutional rights by its decisions
about when . . . death happens. "54 A state "cannot escape its
constitutional responsibilities to death-row prisoners by declaring them already dead, or improve its congressional representation by declaring deceased citizens still alive for that purpose." 55
52. Even if Congress were to use its power to declare unborn humans to be persons
under federal statutory and regulatory law, much of the action in abortion rights would
still be at the state level. After Boerne, it is clear that Congress cannot use its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce or protect rights
that the Court does not recognize. See Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721,729 (2003) ("Section 5 legislation reaching beyond the scope of§ 1's actual guarantees must be an appropriate remedy for identified constitutional violations, not an attempt to substantively redefine the States' legal obligations.") (internal quotation omitted). Thus Congress would be limited to using the commerce clause or the spending
power to restrict abortions. The commerce clause, however, would allow Congress to
restrict abortions only insofar as they take place in or affect interstate commerce; an area
that is presumably fairly small. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-19
(2000); see also Allan Ides, The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 and the Commerce Clause, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 441 (2004). The spending power is superficially
broader, allowing Congress to withhold federal funds from states that do not do what
Congress wants. There are limits, however, on how Congress may condition state access
to federal funds: "Such conditions must (among other requirements) bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal spending, otherwise, of course, the spending power
could render academic the Constitution's other grants and limits of federal authority."
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,167 (1992) (internal citation omitted).
53. Posner, supra note 7, at 444.
54. Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights, supra note 1, at 402.
55. /d.
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Indeed, imagine that a state wanted to declare prisoners dead
upon sentencing. That would unacceptably undermine their right
of appeal, not to mention their right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment while in prison awaiting execution. Constitutional law obviously has some implicit commitments regarding
what counts as being alive and what counts as being dead. States
may be free to define death at the margins, but not in a way that
undermines the basic constitutional commitments.
The question in the abortion context is whether the Constitution not only has implicit commitments to women's liberty to
control reproduction, but also has commitments to excluding
unborn, pre-viable humans from the category of beings in whose
welfare states can take a compelling interest. As we have seen,
the problem with Roe is that it does not provide any reason for
thinking the Constitution is so categorically inhospitable to previable humans. And here is the problem with Dworkin's argument: it trades on what it is meant to shore up. His argument
works only if it is independently clear that the Constitution is
best interpreted to entail that unborn human life cannot be
treated on a par with born human life. But that is exactly what is
not clear.
In Dworkin's defense, the Constitution does implicitly contain some limits on what can count as a person. As Dworkin
notes, states are not free to make corporations persons with a
right to vote. 56 Though the Constitution nowhere sets down a
positive right to vote-it lists only certain bases upon which citizens shall not be denied the right to vote: {1) race, color, or previous condition of servitude; 57 {2). sex; 58 (3) "by reason of failure
to pay any poll tax or other tax"; 9 and (4) age (provided one has
reached age 18) 60 - it is clear from structure of the Constitution
as a whole that the right to vote, at least in federal elections, is
meant to be had by individual citizens, not artificial corporate
"persons." Were states to add corporations to the category of
persons with a right to vote, they would thereby unconstitution-

DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 114.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. This amendment applies to the right to vote in federal elections. The Court declared the citizens cannot be denied the right to vote in state
elections for failure to pay a poll tax in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
56.
57.
58.
59.

(1966).
60.

U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
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ally undermine the national structure of proportional representation in the House of Representatives. 61
Can Dworkin defend a similar argument about undermining
the national structure of the right to an abortion? No. It is clear
that a natural, biological notion of a person is presupposed in the
constitutional concept of a citizen or a person in whose welfare
states can take a compelling interest. But there is reasonable disagreement over whether states ought to be able to take a compelling interest in the lives of unborn humans, even prior to viability. Asserting that treating the unborn as persons in a whole
sense would undermine federal constitutional rights would be
putting the cart before the horse.
It may seem odd to suggest that states have the power to
choose to do things that would limit federal rights. But the oddness here is a reflection of the misleading language used by the
Court. The Court's language reads as though the Court gets to
dictate exactly when states have a compelling interest in protecting human life. "With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the 'compelling' point is at viability. "62 But the Court's language here does not mean that
states must take a compelling interest in fetuses after viability.
Rather, the Court has told states when they may choose to take a
compelling interest in human life. "If the State is interested in
protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe
abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. "63
The important point here is that if a state chooses to do
what Roe allows it to do, it does not undermine any federal constitutional rights. That is, if a state balances its interest in fetal
life, an interest that it may choose to find compelling, against
women's fundamental liberty interest in controlling whether to
bear children, it simply shapes or limits constitutional rights as
the Court says they may be shaped or limited.64 As long as states
61. Proportional representation is guaranteed by the U.S CONST. art. I, § 2,
amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 2. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
62. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
63. Id. at 163-64 (emphasis added).
64. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding race-based affirmative
action on the ground that states have a compelling interest in providing diversity in educational settings, but not, of course, requiring states to take a compelling interest in diversity); see also Coalition for Econ. Equal. v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 7r:B (9th Cir. 1997)
("The Constitution permits the people to grant a narrowly tailored racial preference only
if they come forward with a compelling interest to back it up .... To hold that a democratically enacted affirmative action program is constitutionally permissible because the

2005]

PERSONHOOD FOR THE UNBORN

177

can take a compelling interest in protecting the life of the unborn whenever they are ready to treat the unborn as persons "in
the whole sense," that point applies just as well to regulations
governing the abortion of pre-viable fetuses as to regulations
governing the abortion of post-viable fetuses.
Ultimately, Roe's weakness derives from the fact that it
provides no firm ground for saying that states are constitutionally prohibited from taking a compelling interest in the lives of
unborn humans, even from conception. Roe's ground for denying that Texas and other states could prohibit abortion prior to
viability was the contingent, historical-legal fact that states had
not, at least not as of that time, treated the unborn as persons "in
the whole sense." If that ground were to shift, and at least some
states were to treat unborn humans as persons in the whole
sense (or close enough to the whole sense), then those states
should be permitted to take a compelling interest in the lives of
unborn humans. And if they were to use that interest to shape
and limit the right to an abortion, they would be acting just as
states that prohibit abortion on post-viable fetuses already act
under Roe.
It might be objected that ultimately the Court is responsible
for setting the limits on what a state can take a compelling interest in. States cannot determine that they have a compelling interest in whatever they choose to protect as if they have a compelling interest in it. Imagine, for example, that a state wanted to
take a compelling interest in the welfare of animals and treat
their killing as on a par with the killing of humans. Could a state
then limit federal constitutional rights as a result? Here's a test
case that makes if fairly clear it could not. Suppose the state
wanted to give the death penalty for the aggravated, malicious
killing of animals. 65 It seems clear that if the Eighth Amendment
does not allow a state to give the death penalty for the rape of a
woman,66 then it likewise would not allow a state to give the
death penalty for the killing of an animal. No matter how much a
state cares about animal life, it does not have a compelling interest in animal life for the purposes of the federal Constitution. It
is not up to the state to elevate the killing of an animal to be on a
par with the killing of a human, and the death penalty is reserved
people have demonstrated a compelling state interest is hardly to hold that the program
is constitutionally required. The Fourteenth Amendment, lest we lose sight of the forest
for the trees, does not require what it barely permits.")
65. I am grateful to Thomas Ulen for raising this issue with me.
66. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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for the killing of humans. Likewise, we could imagine that there
is a reason the federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act does not
allow the death penalty for the killing of unborn humans: it
would be unconstitutional because the Constitution does not allow states, or the federal government, to treat unborn humans as
persons in the whole sense.
A proper response has to admit that the Court does have
the ultimate authority and responsibility to determine whether a
state can take a compelling interest in something. Moreover, it is
surely true that a state cannot acquire a compelling interest simply by acting as thought it takes one. Having a compelling interest does not imply taking one, but it is a necessary condition for
taking one. Nevertheless, there is a middle space between those
things that a state clearly has a compelling interest in and those
things that a state clearly does not have a compelling interest in.
In that middle space, I think Roe was right to look to the actual
behavior of the states. In that middle space, if a state acts as
though it takes a compelling interest in something generally, that
should support its claim to take a compelling interest in that
thing in a particular, narrow context. Likewise, if a state does not
generally act as though it takes a compelling interest in something, that should undermine its claim to take a compelling interest in that thing in a particular, narrow context. The status of
the life of unborn humans is a prime candidate to fall in this
middle space.
It may seem that this argument has come too late. It has
been settled law for over thirty years now that states do not have
a compelling interest in the lives of the unborn prior to viability.
The ground on which Roe sat may have been soft, but time can
turn such soft ground firm. 67 But as the Court noted in Casey, "it
is common wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an 'inexorable command. "' 68 A number of things have to be true for stare
decisis to govern a case. Among the relevant conditions for appealing to stare decisis in defense of Roe is, as the Court said in
Casey, that "[n]o evolution of legal principle has left Roe's doctrinal footings weaker than they were in 1973." 69 The problem
67. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (upholding the
decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), because the warnings based on that
case "have become part of our national culture," and because the doctrinal underpinnings of the case are still sound).
68. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854
(1992).
69.

/d. at 857.
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for Roe is that the doctrinal footing rests on two feet. One foot is
the claim that a woman has a fundamental liberty interest in
choosing whether to bear a child. That foot is still strong. But the
other foot is the claim that states do not have a compelling interest in the lives of unborn humans. My point here is that the
changing behavior of states and the federal government may indeed leave this part of Roe's doctrinal footing weaker than it was
in 1973.
In sum, the crucial premise for Dworkin is that states are
constitutionally prohibited from taking a compelling interest in
human life prior to viability. What makes Dworkin's argument at
all plausible is the thought that states have been told that they
lack a compelling interest in the welfare of human life prior to
viability. But if the issue is shoring up the claim that states may
not take, and thereby gain, a compelling interest in the welfare
of human life prior to viability, it simply begs the question to argue as Dworkin does that by doing so states would overrule the
federal constitutional order.
I conclude that Roe is vulnerable to a motion for reconsideration if and when states can demonstrate that they treat, or
come sufficiently close to treating, the unborn, at some stage
prior to viability, as persons more or less "in the whole sense." If
Roe is reconsidered in this light, then any constitutional protection for abortion rights would have to be framed so that those
rights are well grounded even if states do have, and do take, a
compelling interest in the lives of unborn humans, even prior to
viability. 70

70. I addressed this issue in an earlier piece, and stand by my discussion there. See
Walen, supra note 19.

